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Abstract The pairing problem is to enable two devices,
which share no prior context with each other, to agree
upon a security association that they can use to protect
their subsequent communication. Secure pairing should
offer guarantees of the association partner’s identity and
it should be resistant to eavesdropping or to a man-in
the middle attack. We propose a user friendly solution
to this problem. Keys extracted from images of the par-
ticipants are used for authentication. Details of the SAfE
pairing system are presented along with a discussion of
the security features and a usability analysis.
Keywords ad-hoc authentication · biometrics · fuzzy
extractors
1 Introduction
Saxena, et al. [14] define the pairing problem as to enable
two devices which share no prior context with each other,
to agree upon a security association that they can use
to protect their subsequent communication. This means
that a common key must be established. Solutions to
this problem have applications in the area of spontaneous
interaction between mobile devices. There are two types
of challenges in achieving such a secure pairing:
Technical challenges Due to the spontaneous nature of
the interaction we cannot rely on any previously shared
secret information. A solution to this problem is solved
in cryptography by a public key infrastructure (PKI). If
Bob wants to send Alice an encrypted message he will
use Alice’s public key to encrypt the message and send
the encrypted text to her. Only the private key corre-
sponding to the public key used can decrypt this mes-
sage. However, how can Bob be sure that the public key
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he has used does not belong to Eve? A commonly ac-
cepted solution is the use of certificates validated by a
trusted third party which guarantees the authenticity of
a public key. However, we cannot assume that wherever
Alice and Bob meet there will be a network connection
available to connect to a trusted third party, which also
knows both Alice and Bob. Another approach to secure
pairing, mentioned for the first time by Balfanz, et al. [1],
is to use a location limited side channel to authenticate
the key established on the main channel of communi-
cation. A location limited channel (for instance an in-
frared connection) makes it physically difficult for others
to eavesdrop, or to interfere. Devices exchange a limited
amount of information over the side channel, which will
then allow them to complete the authenticated key ex-
change protocol over the main channel.
We propose a protocol that can transfer the trust rela-
tion between people to a trust relation between devices.
Let us elaborate on this idea. When two users, Alice
and Bob, meet at a conference and decide to exchange
business cards or other documents, they talk for a while
until they trust each another sufficiently to exchange in-
formation. However they do not wish other participants
to eavesdrop on their communication or to tamper with
their documents. At this stage the only secure associa-
tion that they have is their trust in each other. To set
up a secure pairing between their devices a protocol is
needed that can transfer this trust to their devices. It is
not enough for Alice’s device to guarantee a secure pair-
ing with device: 128.196.1.3. Alice needs to know that
there is a secure association with Bob’s device. Kind-
berg, et al. [9] use the term physical validation for this
type of trust transfer. Physical validation can be seen as
the physical counterpart of cryptographic authentication
of identity.
User friendliness The most important reason why se-
curity often fails is the lack of user friendliness. To es-
tablish a secure communication, Alice and Bob have to
agree on a key. From a user friendliness point of view
we want Alice and Bob to have minimal interaction with
their devices, and the technical difficulty of the required
task should be at worst similar to that of using a mobile
phone. Also we do not like the idea of Alice and Bob
having to remember a password or a pin code for estab-
lishing the communication key. A user friendly solution is
readily provided by appropriate use of biometrics, since
a fingerprint or the image of a face has the advantage
that it cannot be lost, forgotten and is always available.
However, there is one technical problem that needs to
be solved: no two biometric measurements, even com-
ing from the same user and using the same measurement
setup are identical. This is due to noise, which is typically
Gaussian. In cryptography, good quality cryptographic
secret keys are generated from a uniform distribution.
Because of the distribution mismatch, biometric data is
not directly suitable for use as cryptographic keys. Fuzzy
extractors have been introduced by Dodis, et al. [6] as a
general tool for extracting cryptographic keys from noisy
data such as biometrics. Thus fuzzy extractors can be
used to extract binary, reproducible key material from
biometric data.
Contribution. We present a practical solution to the se-
cure pairing problem where biometrics is used as a side
channel in pairing the devices. This approach has at
least two major advantages. Firstly, it offers the pos-
sibility to transfer trust from humans to machines with-
out any available security infrastructure. Biometric au-
thentication offers physical validation, thus guaranteeing
the identity of a device owner. Secondly, the process is
intuitive. We propose a protocol in which the keys ex-
tracted from biometric data are combined to form a ses-
sion key. The idea is both simple and effective. Suppose
that two users wish to set up a secure communication
channel. Both own a biometrically enabled handheld de-
vice, equipped with a camera and a short range radio (for
example a mobile phone or a PDA). Each device is capa-
ble of recognizing its owner by face recognition [7]. How-
ever, in our protocol the users take each others picture.
Each device now contains a genuine template of its owner
and a measurement that approximates the template of
the other user. The idea is that each device calculates
a common key from the owner template and the guest
measurement. The act of taking a picture corresponds
to sending a message on the location limited channel.
In our solution, all Alice has to do to set up a secure
communication with Bob is to take a picture of him.
2 Preliminaries
Biometric devices use pattern recognition of individual
data found on the body to differentiate individuals. Once
the biometric system receives a signal from its sensor it
will extract a feature vector. The feature vector contains
the essential characteristics to differentiate between in-
dividuals. There are two stages in the lifetime of a bio-
metric system. The first one is the enrolment phase when
the biometric system learns the identity of its users by
collecting several feature vectors and estimating a mean
biometric template for each particular user. The sec-
ond stage is authentication when a measurement of a
user biometric is taken, a feature vector is extracted and
compared to the stored template. The error rates of a
biometric system are determined by the accuracy with
which the matching engine can determine the similarity
between a measured sample x and the expected value of
the template t. We denote by X a random user enrolled
in the biometric system. By t we denote the template
of user X and x represents a random instance of X. We
construct two hypotheses: [H0] x is sampled from X; and
[H1] x is not sampled from X; The matching engine has
to decide which of the two hypotheses H0 or H1 is true.
To express the accuracy of a biometric system the terms
false acceptance rate, FAR and false rejection rate, FRR
are used. The false acceptance rate represents the prob-
ability that H0 will be accepted when in fact H1 is true.
The false rejection rate represents the probability that
the outcome of the matching engine is H1 but H0 is true.
3 Related Work
To describe our protocol we adopt the pairing model
proposed by Balfanz, et al. [1], which has two stages: (1)
pre-authentication when the two devices exchange secret
information using some particular physical contact, in
our case the camera, and (2) authentication when the
two devices identify each other based on the informa-
tion exchanged in the pre-authentication stage. In most
solutions the pre-authentication channel is used mainly
to authenticate public-keys. The hash of the public key
is either vocalized [8] or photographed [12]. Others use
Diffie-Hellman like key agreement scheme where short
sequences transmitted on the private channel authenti-
cate the key establishement exchange on the main chan-
nel [18].
Many types of side channels were proposed in the lit-
erature each with their own properties. Saxena, et al. [14]
propose physical contact (i.e. cables) between devices.
This type of channel has the property that the user can
control precisely which devices are communicating, how-
ever it can become too bulky to carry around all the
necessary interfaces. The authors then extend this ap-
proach to location limited channels, for which they use
short range wireless infrared communication.
McCune, et al. [12] propose to use a visual side chan-
nel and make a photograph of the hash code of a public
key. In the same line of work, Googrich, et al. [8] propose
a human assisted authentication audio channel as a side
channel. They use a text to speech engine for vocalizing
a sentence derived from the hash of a device’s public key.
In previous work [3], we use grip pattern biometrics for
the secure transfer of biometric templates. Mayrhofer, et
al. [11] propose accelerometer based authentication for
devices without interfaces.
Our protocol is a key-agreement protocol in the sense
that both parties equally contribute to the session key.
The protocol achieves authentication of both parties be-
cause the partial keys are extracted from the biometric
identification data of the individual.
4 Extracting cryptographic material from
biometric data
Biometric data is unsuitable to use directly as crypto-
graphic key material due to noise. Biometrics work by
recognizing a user by his biometric template t, which is
a vector consisting of many components (depending on
the exact biometric). When a users biometric is mea-
sured, generally there will be some noise; we will denote
the measurement of the biometric with x. To combat this
noise problem, Dodis, et al. [6] propose to use fuzzy ex-
tractors. Also, fuzzy extractors solve the template stor-
age issue - it is enough to store a (potentially public)
sketch to recognize a person, instead of the sensitive tem-
plate itself.
A fuzzy extractor consists of two algorithms: Encod-
ing and Decoding. Encoding is used during enrolment
(Figure 1 left) of a user X. As input it takes a noise-
free version t (for instance obtained by taking multiple
low-noise measurements and averaging) of the biometric
feature vector and a binary string m (which will be used
as a cryptographic key later on), to compute the public
sketch w. The binary string m can be extracted from the
biometric data itself [16] or it can be generated indepen-
dently [10]. During authentication (Figure 1 right), the
decoding algorithm takes as input a noisy measurement
x of the users biometric together with the public sketch
w, and outputs the binary string m if the measurement
is close enough to the original biometric. Note that gen-
erally both these algorithms operate componentwise on
the feature vector. In other words, if the feature vector
t has N components t1, . . . , tN , the noisy measurement
(eg. a photograph of the user for face biometrics) will
be processed to a feature vector {x1, . . . , xN}. Each of
these components will have its own string mi (gener-
ally consisting of 0-3 bits), and its own public sketch
wi. In particular, this means that even if some failures
occur when processing the complete feature vector, the
resulting bit string will still be close to the correct one.
For example, consider the reliable components scheme of
Tuyls, et al. [16] with security parameter s. This scheme
assumes that an estimate of the global mean µg is known
(for each feature vector component). Enrollment is per-
formed by taking s measurements of the users biometric.
If each of those measurements is larger than the mean,
we getm = 1. Otherwise, if all measurements are smaller
than the mean, we have m = 0. In all other cases, the
component is not used. The public sketch w is set to 0
or 1 according to whether the feature is used or not.
Three parameters are important for the performance
of fuzzy extractors. Firstly, the reliability represents the
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Fig. 1 Cryptographic material from biometric data
probability of an identification error; it is computed as
1 − FRR. Secondly, the embedding rate is the number
of bits that is embedded in each component of the fea-
ture vector. The higher the embedding rate, the longer
the resulting key. In previous work [2], we show that
the FAR determines an upper bound on the number of
truly random bits that can be extracted from a noisy
sequence. Thirdly, the leakage quantizes the amount of
secret information leaked by publishing the public string.
It is characterized by Linnartz, et al. [10] as the Shan-
non mutual information between the secret information
m and the public sketch w. Having low leakage means
that (almost) no information is disclosed on the user data
or secret key.
Face biometrics typically have about 280 features [15].
In order to achieve a key length of 128 bits, this means
that we need to embed about 12 bit per feature vector
component. While the reliable component scheme de-
scribed above achieves a high reliability, in this case it
may result in too short keys. Whether or not this is
enough will have to be decided on a case-by-case ba-
sis. If a longer key is required, one should look at other
fuzzy extractors that embed one (or even more) bits per
component of the feature vector, like the schemes pro-
posed by Chang, et al. [5]. However, a higher embedding
rate does not come for free - it raises the FRR, or the
longer key may not even have more entropy than the
short one, meaning that it actually does not offer more
security despite its greater length.
As a conclusion, the properties of the biometric data
and the selection of the encoding and decoding functions
determine the quality (in terms of randomness) of the
cryptographic material that can be extracted from it. In
the following we explain the authentication protocol and
we analyze the impact of the key quality on the security
of the protocol.
5 SAfE Protocol
The SAfE protocol establishes a shared secret key be-
tween devices whose owners happen to meet and who
have no prior security association.
Protocol preliminaries. The SAfE protocol has three steps:
1. Enrolment is performed once in the lifetime of the pro-
tocol. This step is performed by each of the participants
independently, for example at home, and it is performed
once. Each participantX takes multiple (low-noise) mea-
surements of his own biometric, and uses these to calcu-
late his biometric template vector tX . Next, each par-
ticipant picks a random string mX , and uses the En-
code functionality of the fuzzy extractor to calculate the
matching public sketch wX . After enrolment we have
achieved that: (1) the identity of a user can be verified by
her own device, and (2) a device is prepared to be paired
up with another device on which the SAfE protocol has
been implemented.
2. Pairing where the SAfE protocol is used to create a
secure channel, a secret key is computed by the decode
function of the fuzzy extractor. The protocol description
below provides all the detail of this step.
3. Secure communication when the paired users send
messages, documents etc. encrypted with the key they
derived by the SAfE protocol.
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Fig. 2 Message flow for the SAfE protocol showing the steps
taken by Alice to the left and Bobs actions to the right. The
steps in the middle represent the message exchange.
The Pairing Protocol Before the protocol starts each of
the devices knows the data of its owner, i.e. the tem-
plate, the key and the public sketch. Thus, Alice knows
initially tA, mA, and wA and Bob knows tB , mB , and
wB . The message flow of the SAfE protocol is presented
in Figure 2. Without loss of generality we assume that
Bob starts the protocol. We explain each of the 9 steps:
0: Bob takes a picture of Alice’s face. This is shown as
a transfer of the measurement xA from Alice to Bob on
the biometric channel.
1: Similarly Alice takes a picture of Bob’s, yielding xB .
2: Alice broadcasts her public sketch wA on the wireless
channel.
3: Bob feeds the public sketch wA and the measurement
xA of Alice to the decode function of the fuzzy extractor
to compute a key m′A.
4: Bob broadcasts wB , {xA}m′A , i.e. the tuple consisting
of wB and the encryption of xA using key m′A.
5: Alice uses wB received in plain in Step 4 and xB re-
ceived in Step 1 to compute m′B with the decoding func-
tion of the fuzzy extractor.
6: The second part {xA}m′A of the message is used to help
Alice discover m′A. We expect that due to noise or poor
quality of the biometric sensor mA 6= m′A: However, we
also expect that due to their construction mA and m′A
are close in terms of the Hamming distance so that Alice
can perform an efficient key search algorithm to obtain
m′A from mA. The key search algorithm systematically
flips bits in mA until {xA}m′A can be decrypted success-
fully (see the key search algorithm below for details).
Since Alice can recognize a measurement of her own bio-
metric, she can check the decryption results.
7: Alice broadcasts {xB}m′A||m′B .
8: Bob also performs a key search, flipping bits in the
concatenation of m′A and mB until xB can be decrypted
successfully.
Optionally, if a higher security level is desired, Alice
and Bob can make sure they arrive at the same key by
having both devices calculate a checksum on xA||xB , dis-
playing the number to the users so that they can check
that the numbers agree. There may be some hesitance
about storing the actual template tA on the device. This
is not strictly necessary, but gives more certainty in the
key search phase as described below. Also, when the de-
vice posses the template tA, it is possible to calculate a
fresh mA for every instance of the protocol.
We note that (a) during the protocol both the de-
vices of Alice and Bob have to perform the same amount
of computation, which makes the protocol fair, and (b)
when a user transmits his public sketch w, some infor-
mation is leaked about his biometric template t and his
bitstring m.
Key search algorithm In classical symmetric cryptogra-
phy to decrypt a message encrypted with a key m one
must posses m. In particular, with a key m′ that differs
only in one bit from m, decryption will fail. The SAfE
protocol uses this apparent disadvantage of symmetric
key cryptography as an advantage: m′ is used to form
the session key. The noise of the measurements is used
as random salt [19] for the session key. The key search
algorithm makes it possible to recover m′. Before the al-
gorithm starts we decide on how many trials we make to
discover the key. If we set the error threshold to τ bits
the algorithm will try out
∑τ
i=0
(
l
i
)
combinations before
key search failure.
Alice starts the key search by assuming there are no
errors inm′A, and usesmA to decrypt the encrypted mes-
sage received in step 4. If decryption fails Alice assumes
that there is a one bit difference betweenmA andm′A and
so on until she has tried all combinations, i.e two bits,
three bits etc. Finally, when Alice reaches the limit on
the number of trials she assumes that the key is coming
from an intruder. The recovery of m′A is a related-key at-
tack [13]. When the value of m′A is discovered, Alice can
decrypt the message encrypted with m′A and recognize
xA by comparing it to tA. The comparison is performed
by a classifier based matching algorithm designed for this
particular biometrics. A slightly less secure way is to use
the decode functionality of the fuzzy extractor to recog-
nize whether the decrypted result x is a measurement
of Alice’s biometric, by checking if Dec(x,wA) is equal
to mA. The advantage of this method is that the device
does not need to store the sensitive template tA, but
only the (fixed) mA and wA. Since a fuzzy extractor is
designed to actually correct errors in the (noisy) mea-
surement, not for recognition, we expect this solution to
be somewhat less secure. Bob performs the same search
as Alice, but using mB and m′B .
6 Security Analysis
We want to prevent two attacks. One is an intruder
eavesdropping on the communication line and second is
a man-in-the-middle attack. We assume the adversary,
Eve to be a Dolev-Yao intruder which means that she
has complete control of the main wireless communica-
tion channel. She can listen or modify messages on the
communication channel between the devices. However,
Eve cannot send or tamper with messages on the se-
cure biometric side channel. We will assume that Eve
has the ability to compare two biometric measurements,
and that she can determine whether or not these come
from the same person.
Eavesdropping To derive keys from fuzzy data we use a
related-key attack in steps 6 and 8 of the protocol, to
recover the session key. This approach raises two ques-
tions: ”If both Alice and Bob have to guess the session
key, how much more difficult is it for Eve (the intruder)
to do the same?”, and ”What kind of guarantees is this
protocol offering?” To answer these questions we study
the following scenarios:
AE(0) No previous contact between Alice and Eve.
AE(1) Eve records a measurement of Alice’s biometric
from a previous round of the protocol. From the pub-
lic string Eve constructs m′′A.
We denote by W (x → y) the average number of trials
that Eve has to do to guess y when she knows x. We
analyze Eve’s workload to guess m′A in the two scenarios
above. Alice (and the same holds for Bob) who knowsmA
and who has to guess m′A = mA+e where the Hamming
weight is wt(e) ≤ τ , and where e is the noise and τ is
an appropriate threshold. As the secret key length is l,
there are
(
l
i
)
different error patterns if the actual number
of errors is i, thus on average Alice will have to guess:
W (mA → m′A) ≈
1
2
τ∑
i=0
(
l
i
)
+
1
2
.
Table 1 Guesswork required for Eve to compute the session
key
AE(0) AE(1)
BE(0) W (0→m′A)·W (0→m′B) W (m′′A→m′A)+W (0→m′B)
BE(1) W (0→m′A)·W (m′′B→m′B) W (m′′A→m′A)+W (m′′B→m′B)
In scenario AE(1), Eve knows m′′A and has to guess m
′
A
where m′′A = mA + e
′, thus m′′A = m
′
A + e
′ + e. Since
wt(e′ + e) ≤ 2τ , Eve has workload:
W (m′′A → m′A) ≈
1
2
2τ∑
i=0
(
l
i
)
+
1
2
.
In scenario AE(0) Eve has no information on Alice thus
she has to brute force all possibilities. Thus the number
of trials is approximately:
W (0→ m′A) ≈
2l + 1
2
.
The scenarios for Bob are analogous:
BE(0) No previous contact between Bob and Eve.
BE(1) Eve records a measurement of Bob.
Eve’s workload for guessing m′B is equal to guessing
m′A in the analogous scenario. To be able to listen on
the communication channel Eve has to guess m′a||m′b
in all scenarios. Table 1 summarizes her workload. In
each row we have the information that Eve knows about
Bob and in the column the information that Eve knows
about Alice. Due to the message flow in the protocol
(see figure 2), Eve might have an advantage if she has
information about Alice. Eve can intercept message 4:
wB , {xA}m′A and recover m′A if the biometrics allows for
taking a decision on whether two measurements come
from the same individual. This explains the plus sign
between the work of guessing m′A and the work of guess-
ing m′B in the columns where Eve has some knowledge
about Alice. The amount of work that is required from
Eve in the scenarios above is summarized in table 1. In
the worst-case scenario, if Eve has had interactions with
both Alice and Bob, this means that Eve only has to
do twice as much work as either of the participants. In
all other cases, there is at least one key that has to be
recovered from scratch, making the attack infeasible.
MiM attack. A man-in-the-middle attack is an attack
where Eve is able to read, insert and modify at will, mes-
sages between Alice and Bob without either party know-
ing that the link between them has been compromised.
Eve must be able to observe and intercept messages ex-
changed between the two victims. To prevent such an at-
tack keys need to be authenticated. Key authentication
is achieved by the optional verification function in the
last step of the protocol. During verification a check sum
is computed on the pair (xA, xB). Alice authenticates
xA, by successful decryption of message 4 while Bob au-
thenticates xB by successful decryption of message 7. If
the check sums computed by both device match upon
visual comparison it means key m′A||m′B is authentic.
7 Usability Analysis
We conducted a comparative usability analysis between
a PIN based pairing method and SAfE pairing. As a
guideline we used the usability study by Uzun, et al. [17]
for secure pairing methods. Our results are presented for
a comparable target population.
Test design and procedure Each subject was given a brief
introduction to the spontaneous interaction scenario where
people need to exchange sensitive information without
having any prior security association. The researcher ex-
plained that the subject has to try two different pairing
methods; one is the standard Bluetooth pin based pairing
method and the other is our SAfE protocol. The subjects
were asked to complete a background questionnaire first,
so that we could learn about the subject demographics
and mobile device usage history. Next, the subject was
asked to try both pairing methods in a random order. For
the SAfE protocol we wrote a program that implements
only the user interaction part of the SAfE protocol. For
the PIN based pairing we used the standard Bluetooth
pairing method as provided in our device. Each subject
was asked to choose a 4 digit PIN number and to en-
ter it. For the SAfE protocol the subject was asked to
take a picture of the researcher. All other actions with
the PDAs were performed by the researcher. It was ex-
plained that only the steps required to perform the pair-
ing are the subject of our experiment. After completing
both pairing protocols subjects were asked to fill in the
post-test questionnaire. The testing was done in a room
with no disturbance and the testing time was around
20 minutes per subject with at least 15 minutes of free
discussions. During both pairing protocols subjects were
using the same ETEN M600+ PDA.
Participant profile Our usability experiment had 30 par-
ticipants from a university environment representing 13
different countries. The demographics such as gender,
age and education for our subjects are presented in ta-
ble 2. Most of our subjects have a computer science back-
ground. The average computer usage history was around
Table 2 Participant profile.
Gender Age Education
Male: 60%
Female: 40%
18−24: 10%
25−29: 56.6%
30−34: 20%
35−39: 6.66%
40+: 6.66%
High school: 6.66%
Bachelor: 16.66%
Masters: 46.66%
Doctorate: 30.66%
15 years with an average of 9 computer hours per day.
All participants have a mobile phone, a PDA or a laptop.
Analysis and discussions The conclusions drawn from
the experiment can be considered only as indicative due
to the small number of participants and the (university)
biased profile of our subjects.
The main purpose of our experiment was to discover
whether users would find it easier to use SAfE protocol
compared to a standard 4 digit PIN based pairing. As
shown in figure 3 the score was tight with slightly more
people preferring PIN pairing.
SAfE
Fig. 3 Summary of participants opinion (in percent)
The explanation for the overall preference for the
PIN based method is that subjects are familiar with PIN
based security (ATMs, Bluetooth) and typing numbers is
natural to subjects with a computing background. Some
subjects used the adjective ’easy’ to describe the SAfE
method. Others found it easy to understand how PIN
based pairing method works but they used the word
’magic’ to describe the SAfE protocol. We did not try
the experiment with a longer PIN and it is worth noting
that approximately 80% of our participants choose the
same PIN number.
Most of our subjects, 90%, found it fun to perform the
pairing using a camera and 73% would like to have both
pairing methods on their mobile device (in figure 3 the
percentage of only PIN or only SAfE choices are shown).
Due to the game effect of taking pictures the adjective
’professional’ was used more to describe PIN than SAfE.
A separate topic in the questionnaire concerned the
privacy effect of giving away a photo to the researcher.
To our surprise 56% of the subjects were not bothered
to have their picture taken by a relative stranger. For
those 44% who are bothered nothing changes if they
have the photograph of the researcher. They suggested
that it would make them feel better if they could have a
privacy guarantee such as ’picture deleted after pairing
complete’. To our satisfaction 87% of the users want to
have security while communicating wirelessly. A techni-
cal report version of this paper [4] provides all the details
of the experiments.
8 Conclusion
Secure spontaneous device pairing is a challenging prob-
lem from both the technical and user interface point
of view. Firstly, users need to exploit a common secret
source of randomness from which to extract a shared se-
cret key. Secondly, it should be possible to link the device
we connect to with the person who owns it. Thirdly, the
process should be simple such that for any person with
non technical background the protocol is easy to use.
We propose to use biometrics as a secure side chan-
nel. Our SAfE protocol offers physical validation while
at the same time the protocol is easy to use. We analyze
the resilience to eavesdropping and a Man-in-the-Middle
(MiM) attack (if the optional verify step is added) in
the general setting of a Dolev-Yao intruder. We show
that our protocol is not vulnerable to a MiM attack and
we analyze eavesdropping in four different scenarios. We
show that in the best case scenario for the eavesdropper
her workload grows exponentially faster than the work-
load of Alice and Bob (the participants to the protocol).
The usability analysis shows that our subjects find
the SAfE method fun to use, and that they would like
to have the SAfE pairing available on their mobile de-
vices. However, there are some situations where SAfE is
not appropriate: (a) when the participants wish to com-
municate without drawing attention (such as in a restau-
rant or at a business meeting) (b) when the protocol fails
(for example under bad lighting conditions). Therefore a
back-up solution for SAfE is needed that is smoothly in-
tegrated with the system. The user would then have the
choice of a more user friendly biometric based pairing
method and a more robust alternative method.
We are working on a complete prototype that runs
SAfE on two mobile devices. We are particularly inter-
ested in testing the influence of different environments on
the key search failure since environmental effects such as
changing the light conditions can seriously affect the face
recognition performance.
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